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Perry Anderson and the British Ideology

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The question that lingers with me after reading *The Indian Ideology* is not amenable to an easy resolution—what is at stake for Perry Anderson in making the breathtaking claim that his book, for the first time ever, in this second decade of the 21st century, exposes a certain celebratory discourse about India? I am not certain I will arrive at an answer by the end of this essay, or at any rate, I suspect the answer may not be a polite one.

There have been several thoughtful reviews of Anderson's arguments already. Among others, Vijay Prashad and Dilip Simeon wrote reviews of the book and Ananya Vajpeyi responded to Anderson's essay on Gandhi published in *London Review of Books.*[1] There were substantial letters to the editor responding to Anderson's three essays in the *London Review of Books* that preceded this book, notably one by Karuna Mantena.[2] The central questions raised by such responses are brought together by Praful Bidwai in an interview by email with Anderson after the publication of *The Indian Ideology.* This interview is a good place to start because here Anderson reiterates his overall argument and offers a considered response to critiques.

In this interview, Anderson characterizes the "conventional wisdom" about India that he counters, as celebrating

> "the democratic stability, multi-cultural unity, and impartial secularity of the Indian state as a national miracle. There are, of course, other ideologies in India, some of them more dangerous. But this is the mainstream discourse of the state, the media and the intelligentsia."[3]

In his book, he names five authors in particular as the proponents of this Ideology—Meghnad Desai, Ramachandra Guha, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Sunil Khilnani and Amartya Sen. As Prashad points out, even these writers are not uncritically celebratory of the "Indian Ideology," and "struggle with the contradictions of contemporary India".[4] Indeed, it is to Khilnani's sharp critique that Anderson turns when he needs to reference his characterization of the Constituent Assembly as non-representative. Khilnani terms it a "strikingly narrow body ... dominated by upper caste and Brahmanic elites" who produced a Constitution that was "akin to club house rules" (106, note 4). Khilnani is the only reference Anderson in fact provides for his critical account of the Constituent Assembly. Clearly, even these five works that are largely sanguine about Indian democracy are not blind to its severe limitations.

In the interview with Bidwai, Anderson claims that his book "advances five main arguments that run counter to conventional wisdom in India today":

> "Firstly, that the idea of a subcontinental unity stretching back six thousand years is a myth. Secondly, that Gandhi's injection of religion into the national movement was ultimately a disaster for it. Thirdly, that primary responsibility for Partition lay not with the Raj, but Congress. Fourthly, that Nehru's legacy to Republic was far more ambiguous than his admirers will admit. Lastly, that Indian democracy is not contradicted by caste inequality, but rather enabled by it."

Bidwai then asks him why he thinks that even the many others who have in fact been "critical of the Indian state's claims to be uniquely democratic, secular and respectful of diversity" were 'upset by' his essays in the *London Review of Books.* Anderson responds:

> "My guess ... is that the upset could be due to two things. The first would be that, although this or that strand in the Indian Ideology may be questioned, a systematic deconstruction of them hasn't previously been attempted. To inter-connect these as a dominant discourse throws each of them into a sharper and more critical light ... The second thing which may be disconcerting is really a question of tone. One of the effects of the Indian Ideology, even on many who might disclaim subscription to it, is the diffusion of a culture of euphemism, in which disagreeable realities are draped with decorous evasions or periphrases—'human rights abuses' for torture or murder, 'hostiles' for rebels, and the rest. To any sensibility accustomed to this kind of verbal emulsion, calling a spade a spade is bound to be jarring."

Both of Anderson's guesses in other words, lead to the conclusion that these other critics of what he calls the Indian Ideology, have been cocooned in a comforting "verbal emulsion" that still enabled some optimism, which he has essentially stripped away. Shocked by what emerges when this pitiless deconstruction is carried out in the clear light of Anderson's righteous rage, they close ranks in nationalist denial.[5]

Still, Bidwai persists, hasn't Anderson "ignored or under-rated the sharply critical, even iconoclastic thrust of writings by many Indians that are a far cry from the self-congratulatory imaginary of the 'Idea of India'?" No he hasn't, says Anderson, "there are plenty of references to Indian scholars" in his book, who are critical of "much in today's Union," and he lists

several, among them, Sumit Sarkar, Radhika Desai and Ranajit Guha (whose "brilliant work" *Domination without Hegemony* he would have "liked to have discussed at some length"). Nor does he think that all those whom he cites as voices of the Indian Ideology "are pure prisoners of it." But, he insists:

> "as an overarching set of tropes about India, the ideology remains in place, and I believe hasn't yet been the object of a systematic critique. The hope of the book would be to set the ball rolling for less general piety about them."

Anderson's British Ideology

In what follows, I counter Anderson's five claims. Let me start with the third claim, about Partition, because it illustrates most clearly Anderson's 'British Ideology' at work, an Ideology that is evident through the entire book. By British Ideology I mean the assumption that Britain somehow stumbled into its colonies, tried its best to run these far flung outposts the best it could, introducing Rule of Law in the face of Oriental Despotism and rational management of resources in the face of the wasteful extravagance of feudal petty princelings. Later, they had to face the machinations and internecine quarrels of the wily native elites who emerged thanks to English education, and finally, in an act of unforgiveable callousness, abandoned their subjects to their own conflagrations and beat too hasty a retreat. This is how the story of colonialism and nationalism in India emerges on these pages. Not a very Marxist analysis? Precisely.

The first two chapters titled 'Independence' and 'Partition' are recounted in the breathless clichéd style of popular works like *Freedom at Midnight* (which at least was fun to read and made no claims to original arguments), and the reader is hard put to remember that this writer is a Marxist scholar when the story of India's Independence and Partition of the subcontinent are told in a salacious, gossipy tone, largely in terms of personalities and love affairs. Just one instance:

> "Within weeks, not only was the Congressman fast friends with the Viceroy, but soon thereafter in bed with his wife, to the satisfaction of all concerned ... Affairs of the heart rarely affect affairs of state. But in this case the erotic ties of the triangle were, at the least, unlikely to tilt British policy towards the League" (65).

Many historians have made the argument that the responsibility for Partition lies as much with the Congress as with "the Raj," but as we shall see, Anderson has mastered the art of unscrupulous citation to buttress his claims to originality. Thus, Joya Chatterji, who has made this argument carefully in her study of Bengal, gets a footnote in passing, as if it is incidental to Anderson's own independently arrived at argument. Ayesha Jalal too, has made this argument about Partition, but although she gets two footnotes, one is for a quotation from Mountbatten, and the other for "rewriting the field" on Jinnah, without any mention of Partition—because of course, this is Anderson's unique argument, never made before by an Indian or Pakistani. The claim of Congress' responsibility for Partition has, interestingly, also been made by Hindu nationalist politician Jaswant Singh, whose praise of Jinnah *contra* Congress in his book, led to his expulsion from the BJP.[6] Had Anderson been a serious enough scholar to consider this book and the expulsion carefully, his monolithic "Indian Ideology" would have revealed irreparable fractures. But I can confidently state that if there is one thing Anderson cannot be accused of in this book, it is serious scholarship.

Anderson goes further though, than assigning equal responsibility—the "primary" responsibility lay with the Congress, not the Raj. The fact that the British Empire 'bequeathed a series of Partitions' is mentioned in passing (76), but Anderson refuses to confront the fact that Partition was a deliberate British colonial policy, which was worked out not only in India, but in Ireland and Palestine and Cyprus, where no "handsome" natives (such as Nehru, 49) were bedding the British ruler's missus. British imperialism in Anderson's rendering is something like a large bumbling foolish puppy, helplessly manipulated by the sharp, unscrupulous, wheeling-and-dealing Indians. What Anderson describes as 'the single most contemptible act in the annals of the Empire' (77) is this—that "having lit the fuse, Mountbatten handed over the buildings to their new owners hours before they blew up" (77). The most contemptible act of Empire in Anderson's view then, is that the British left the Indians to their own devices, instead of staying on to perform their duty as enjoined by the White Man's Burden!

Indian independence did not come from passive resistance, says Anderson, nor from "sexual abstinence, individual or universal" (45). (The book is full of charming little asides of this sort, by the way. The British Ideology is very strict about the necessity to mock native attempts to run counter to mainstream British wisdom on anything.) "Independence was the result of two other dynamics"—the broadening of the electoral machinery first introduced by the British in 1909, but this alone did not bring about independence because the Congress was inherently undemocratic and conservative, and no different from the Raj, so the final resolution may well have been deferred forever (45–6). The "hammer-blow from outside" that changed the situation overnight was the Japanese Army knocking at the gates of the British Empire (47–8). Decolonization had nothing to do with the resistance of colonized peoples—it had to do entirely

with the colonizing power's magnanimity in introducing representative institutions on the one hand, and the challenge posed by rival Empires, on the other.

Now, many historians have no doubt that India's independence was not achieved by Gandhian non-violent civil disobedience alone. Sumit Sarkar, for instance, offers what is by now a widely accepted framework for understanding August 15, 1947.[7] This includes the two factors listed by Anderson, with representative institutions being understood as a way of co-opting local elites into the running of Empire; but also the several more radical and armed strands of resistance that refused to die down, including the INA, the Royal Indian Navy mutiny with its massive popular support, militant peasant movements and revolutionary terrorist activities. In the face of the latter strands of resistance, according to Sarkar, the Congress and the British government came to the conclusion that if a negotiated 'transfer of power' did not take place immediately, it would not be in the interests of either. This is a very different argument for why it was not Satyagraha alone that brought about Independence, and it does not in any way conform to Anderson's Indian Ideology. Small wonder then, that this perspective is entirely absent.

Unethical Citation Practices

Anderson's first claim, that "the idea of a subcontinental unity stretching back six thousand years" has never been countered before him, is ridiculous. There is a phenomenal body of scholarship that deconstructs the moment of emergence of Indian nationalism in the 19th century as the one in which for the first time, the 'six thousand year old Nation' was posited. To name a few—Uma Chakravarti, Sudipta Kaviraj and more generally, the Subaltern Studies critiques of nationalist historiography.[8] This argument that the idea of the Indian nation as a six thousand year old entity is born only in the 19th century, is common sense among Indian scholars and a list trying to enumerate all those who assume this as a given, would be impossible.

From this follows the most striking feature of the book, which appears at first to be a methodological issue, but as with all methodological issues, it has grave substantive implications. I refer to Anderson's unethical citation practices. By this I mean the rehearsal of well known critiques of Gandhi, Nehru, Partition and so on, with no references whatsoever except to primary sources such as autobiographies, contemporary accounts and collected works of key players themselves, as if Anderson has arrived at these critical accounts by a perusal of primary material alone. It would be tedious to recount every instance of this, but let's take a few examples. First, the account of the non-cooperation movement, Gandhi's incorporation of Khilafat as a demand, and the Chauri Chaura incident leading to the calling off of the movement (25–29)—all of this without a single reference other than the Collected Works of Gandhi and Wavell's journal. A movement that has been extensively and critically analyzed by among others, the Subaltern Studies historians (resplendent by their total absence in a book, a third of which is on the national movement), has apparently been analyzed by Anderson for the first time critically, straight from primary sources. Even Ranajit Guha, whose "brilliant" work Anderson is forced to acknowledge in the interview with Bidwai (most probably after glaring omissions such as this were pointed out in the critical responses I have listed above), gets not one mention.

Again, in the account of the civil disobedience movement, Anderson analyzes Gandhi's choice of Bardoli (a ryotwari region) as the site of civil disobedience over a zamindari region, as reflecting Gandhi's reluctance to bring peasants in direct conflict with Indian landlords rather than the British state (33–34). This is backed by references to Stanley Wolpert and the collected works of Gandhi. The critique that Anderson makes on these pages is familiar to any undergraduate student who has read Sumit Sarkar's *Modern India*—Gandhi's attempt to bring the increasingly alienated Muslims back to the nationalist fold through an issue that mobilized the most regressive tendencies in global Islam, and his repeated applying of brakes on popular agency in the course of mass mobilization, not to mention his deliberate choice of a ryotwari region to launch non-payment of taxes.

Sarkar's three decade old Marxist account of the national movement, and of Gandhi's role in it, remains unsurpassed in its sophistication and generous references to a vast field of scholarship. However, Sarkar is missing throughout Anderson's account over large parts of which *Modern India* hovers benignly if anonymously. How then does he claim to Bidwai that he has cited Sarkar? Because, Sarkar is quoted once in the book, much later (74), as saying something remarkably anodyne about a bloodless Independence followed by a bloody Partition. When we peer-review manuscripts, this is one form of unethical citation practice we often encounter—the use of an author's argument without citation, and a later citation of that author for something banal in another place altogether.

The same thing happens with Anderson's account of how Kashmir got incorporated into the Indian State. He tells the story well known outside the nationalist fold, of the shenanigans by which Hari Singh was made to accede to India, an accession that was conditional, subject to 'a reference to the people' as soon as the Pathan tribesmen had been removed. This condition was necessary for the Indian State to overcome Hari Singh's reluctance to accede to India, and moreover, it was this principle of 'the people's will' that enabled India to annex

two other states, Junagadh, and Hyderabad. Of course, India eventually reneged on the referendum. This story is outlined with admirable clarity in Balraj Puri.[9] But Anderson's telling of this familiar story of "a province with an overwhelming Muslim majority" "acquired by force and ... fraud" (84) is supposedly drawn entirely from official papers and memoirs of key players of the time, apart from Alastair Lamb and Ian Copland, scholars who can safely be cited because their critical accounts do not challenge Anderson's assertion that *Indian* scholars are incapable of escaping the Indian Ideology. He cannot possibly cite Gautam Navlakha's innumerable writings in *Economic and Political Weekly*,[10] Mridu Rai or Balraj Puri, all of whom have given us histories of Kashmir's accession that are resolutely antinationalist.[11] Balraj Puri gets one footnote much later, but only to reference a quote of Nehru—"Till things improve, democracy and morality can wait" (119–20). Puri's own scholarship is not acknowledged.

The most egregious example of this last kind of citation is note 44 on page 139, which reveals both shoddiness and intellectual dishonesty. The note is placed at a statement by Jagjivan Ram, and the reference is to two page numbers, 255 and 119, of a book edited by Rajeev Bhargava, *Politics and Ethics of the Indian Constitution*. The authors of the essays are not named, which is very strange, when citing an edited volume. But neither page in any case, turns out to have any reference to Jagjivan Ram. Page 255 is in an essay by Christophe Jaffrelot, and page 119 is an essay by Aditya Nigam. In the latter, we find as an epigraph to the essay, a quotation from Ambedkar reproduced by Anderson after the footnote, with no reference. So the footnote is wrongly placed and wrongly mentions page numbers of no relevance, while Ambedkar's statement receives no citation. Petty to point out mere carelessness?

But the issue is more serious. Since it is not academic practice to cite page numbers from an edited volume only under the name of the editor rather than the name of the author(s) of the essay(s) being cited, one has to see this as part of Anderson's strategy of deliberately ignoring Indian scholarship that does not sit well with his claim of the ubiquity and invincibility of the Indian Ideology among Indian scholars. The essay by Aditya Nigam is on the Constituent Assembly and the epigraph (which Anderson quotes) is Ambedkar saying bitterly about his role in making the constitution, "I was a hack." Had Anderson not simply plundered the quotation, but engaged with the essay itself, he would have had to acknowledge Indian scholarship that is neither caught in the trap of his Indian Ideology nor fails to take Ambedkar seriously as a thinker and political activist.

A second kind of citation problem is that where primary material cannot possibly be referenced, authors well known to be the key voices that have articulated arguments that Anderson presents as his own, are cited in footnotes, but in the form of "Also see ...", as if these are additional resources rather than the very basis of Anderson's account. For instance, Sugata Bose's history of Subhash Chandra Bose's role in the national movement is cited as "For these events, see ...", and Anderson adds gratuitously that Bose's "ancestral loyalty has not overpowered intellectual balance and sobriety"! (43) Or Benjamin Zachariah's almost decade old book on Nehru is acknowledged thus: "Brief but on the whole acute, this debut by a young scholar is perhaps the best critical study ..." (90, note 56). One author's youth, another's family lineage—everything is grist to Anderson's offensively patronizing tone.

In several places there are footnotes to works by Tapan Raychaudhuri, Mushirul Hasan, Manmathnath Gupta, and others, but the text continually reproduces the damning information about the Congress, Nehru and Gandhi derived from the work of these scholars, as if Anderson has revealed it for the first time.

Another argument that Anderson makes, which he claims is "regularly ignored in the literature," is that the first-past-the-post electoral system has inflated Congress victory at the polls far beyond its actual support. He mentions Meghnad Desai who "does not touch on the electoral system" at all (95, note 61). But he has already established Desai as one of the architects of the Indian Ideology—should he not look elsewhere for an acknowledgement of this factor? Indeed it turns out that he has come across at least one study, and it is cited much later, in the form we have come to recognize—"For a clear eyed account of the imposition of FPP after independence, see E Sridharan ..." (107, note 5). Critiques of what Anderson calls the FPP (normally, in "the literature," abbreviated as FPTP) can be found as long ago as 1975 in the Tarkunde Committee report, and in the 1998 Law Commission Report. In election studies this is a factor that is addressed routinely, with scholars making the argument that radical agendas and smaller parties stand little chance under FPTP. The former Chief Election Commissioner T. S. Krishnamurthy, on completing his stint in 2005, called for a national debate on replacing the first-past-the-post system since people with barely 20 percent of the vote become representatives when 80 percent have voted against them.[12] Ambedkar himself had come to the realization that "parliamentary democracy under the first-past-the-post system would not enable minorities in India to achieve genuine political representation".[13] There has been considerable debate for decades on the FPTP, and periodically other electoral systems, such as Proportional Representation (PR), are considered seriously in public debate. If the system has not changed, it's partly because of the stakes that the major political

parties have in retaining the system, and partly because PR has several problems, not least of which is the control it leaves in the hands of party bosses. Why would Anderson need to say this widely debated factor is "regularly ignored in the literature" unless his research is inadequate? Of course, he has clearly read at least one (decade old) work that makes this argument, and just following its references would have made him wiser on this issue.

Another such false claim is that the massive growth of a "paramilitary and surveillance complex" that has developed over the decades does not "receive even passing mention in the literature" (170). Turns out that Anderson makes this grand pronouncement about "the literature," on the basis of a quick browsing of the *Oxford Companion to Politics in India* (169). Later he hastily notes two "honourable exceptions"—both, he adds meaningfully, "based abroad" (170). Seriously? Anderson should sack his research assistant. Who would drown in the deluge of fact-finding reports, academic papers, articles in the mainstream media by academics and activists, and books—AR Desai, Singh, Kannabiran, Louis and Vashum?[14] Not to mention the indefatigable Upendra Baxi.[15] Baxi gets a mention in Anderson's critique of the Supreme Court, where Baxi's Introduction to SP Sathe's "generally optimistic" *Judicial Activism in India* is cited, but evidently, Anderson has no idea about Baxi's body of work. It is as if Anderson went looking for "generally optimistic" writings to make his grandiose claims to originality, remaining ignorant of, or deliberately ignoring, the enormous body of scholarship that has been there and done that.

Such citation practices are not merely incidental to the substance of Anderson's book, but are constitutive of his claim to be systematically exposing The Indian Ideology for the very first time. For instance, there are only two references in the entire book to articles in *Economic and Political Weekly* (which he describes as India's "best periodical)." Both are reviews of books on Gandhi, one by Kathryn Tidrick, which he is very enthusiastic about (Tidrick's book, not the review), and the other by Joseph Lelyveld (*Great Soul*)—about which, more later. A perusal of *EPW* for its substantial papers and commentaries would have given him a week-by-week demolition of his Indian Ideology (particularly of the legitimacy of the paramilitary and surveillance complex). Small wonder he stays resolutely away from it. Anderson could as well have presented this book with more humility and honesty as bringing together a range of scholarship on India that has emerged from this region as well as from the West, which has continually challenged the India Shining image as propagated in the mainstream. But that would require him to abandon his air of self-righteousness and "general piety" (his phrase for the 'Indian ideology') that he adopts vis-à-vis Indian scholarship.

Gandhi, Nehru and Indian Scholarship

Unethical citation practices apart, Anderson is singularly unequipped to study intellectual formations and thought, taking recourse to formulations like "strange pot pourri" and adjectives like "garbled" when engaging with Gandhi's attempts to fashion new notions of an "Indian" self by drawing on a variety of sources. Self-formation in all cultures is a "garbled" process marked by the owning and disowning of specific histories. The post-Enlightenment Western self that Anderson seems to take for granted, emerged precisely through its disavowal of its own "pot-pourri" of Black civilizational roots and of the Arab routes that Greek philosophy took into Europe.

The pot pourri referred to is Gandhi's "peculiar," "home-made" religion, "unlike any existing belief-system at the time" (18). If it's unfamiliar to Anderson, he pours scorn on it, in the robust fashion of a 19th century British adventurer coming across native superstitions and fetishes. He spends considerable energy in promoting a book by Kathryn Tidrick which came out to "deafening silence," he says, in India, which he expected, since any critical reading of Gandhi is unwelcome in India. But apparently it was received with silence "on the whole, in Britain too" (18). Now, why was the book not taken seriously in Britain either? Is there a "Mahatma"-worshipping, Indian Ideology-promoting elite controlling the British media as well? Or is the book simply not worth the notice Anderson gives it? A favorable review by William Dalrymple notes that Tidrick, in an "original and convincing" argument, locates "the roots of Gandhi's thought in the lunatic spiritualist fringe of late-Victorian England, among the occultists, high fibre-ists and mediums who flourished in late 19th-century London." According to Tidrick (as quoted by Dalrymple):

> "Mohandas Gandhi entered politics, not to liberate his country in the sense understood by other Indian leaders but to establish the Kingdom of Heaven on earth. The principal feature of this belief system was that he, Gandhi, was the pre-ordained and potentially divine world saviour whose coming was implicit in the 'Eastern' religious writings to which so many of his English acquaintances had turned . . . [He came to believe that] it was his destiny to lead a troubled world along the path of salvation."

This crassly Orientalist analysis—which seems to pretty much do the usual hatchet job on Gandhi's spirituality, obsession with sexuality and celibacy, sleeping in the nude with his great-niece, his food fads,

enemas, fasting and so on—is one that Anderson applauds. We are well aware of the "Mahatma"-deifying culture in India which is allergic to critical work on Gandhi. But Tidrick's book, even from the admiring descriptions provided by Dalrymple and Anderson, scarcely seems to be the "first notable study of Gandhi's religious and political thinking." Anderson appears to be ignorant of Erikson, Dalton and Hardiman, which even if you disagree with their largely sympathetic analyses, are definitely "notable studies" of Gandhi's thinking.[16]

He mentions Joseph Lelyveld's *Great Soul* in a footnote, which he claims was "deeply respectful," despite which it was greeted with "defensive reflexes," citing a review by Rajmohan Gandhi in *EPW*. That's all we get about *Great Soul*, making one wonder if Anderson read it or even the review at all. This is a book that hints at Gandhi's homoerotic desire for Hermann Kallenbach as revealed in their letters and exposes his racism towards Blacks in South Africa. After the book was salaciously written about by the British tabloid *Daily Mail*, it hit the headlines in India for being banned by Narendra Modi's government in Gujarat that had master-minded the carnage of Muslims in 2002. This ban was widely criticized in India, not the least for the claims of hurt sentiments by a political formation responsible for Gandhi's assassination.[17] Interesting that Anderson should ignore this nugget of information.

Could it be that Anderson deliberately avoids any confrontation with the serious contradiction posed by Modi's ban for his second claim of Gandhi's "injection" of Hinduism into the national movement? I refer of course, to the Hindu Right's antipathy towards Gandhi (accompanied by the occasional lip service to him that is unavoidable in India). Modi's ban on Lelyveld's book is of a piece with his attempts to climb back into the largely secular mainstream after 2002, trying to replace his 2002 image with that of a potential national leader who has brought 'development' to Gujarat—and claiming Gandhi it appears, is crucial *to this new project, not to his old Hindutva platform*. Should Anderson spare a moment to think about this?

Anderson does not so much as mention that Gandhi's assassination was carried out by a representative of the Hindu Right twelve days after his last fast. Nor that this fast was undertaken to pressurize the Indian government to return to Pakistan monies owed to it, which the Indian government was holding back on the grounds that Pakistan had sent tribal invaders into Kashmir.[18] In a speech before he started this fast, Gandhi said about the shrine of Qutub-ud-din Bakhtiyar Chishti in Delhi which had been attacked by Hindu mobs: "The Muslims living in the vicinity of the shrine for the last eight hundred years had to leave their homes … It is the duty of Hindus, Sikhs and the officials of the government to open the shrine, and wash this stain off us. The same applies to other shrines and religious places of Muslims in and around Delhi".[19]

Gandhi described what turned out to be his last fast, as being "undoubtedly on behalf of the Muslim minority in the Union and, therefore, it is necessarily against the Hindus and Sikhs of the Union and the Muslims of Pakistan. It is also on behalf of the minorities in Pakistan as in the case of the Muslim minority in the Union … The fast is a process of self-purification for all of us".[20]

The point here is not to deify Gandhi as an 'apostle of peace,' but to point to the complexities in the way Gandhi engaged with religion and religious identity, even as he continually used Hindu idioms such as Ram Rajya and so on. The layered nature of 'Gandhi,' Gandhism and their varied receptions in different quarters in India escapes Anderson completely; not surprising, since he studiously avoids the large body of sophisticated scholarship that has attempted to come to grips with this phenomenon.

The shallowness of Anderson's analysis in fact prevents a recognition of the range of serious critiques of Gandhi and Gandhism that can be discerned on the intellectual landscape of India—from Ambedkar himself to contemporary Dalit-Bahujan intellectuals (G Aloysius, Kancha Ilaiah), Marxists (Sumit Sarkar, Ranajit Guha) and feminists (V Geetha, Ashwini Tambe). Apart from Sarkar tangentially (as noted above), not one of these, needless to say, has been cited.

Ambedkar's devastating critique in his essay "Gandhism," of Gandhi's defense of *varnashrama dharma* and his conservative economic program based on the notion of Trusteeship of Property are well-known. I may add though, that it is one thing for the arch modernist Ambedkar in the 1920s to see machinery and unrestricted industrialization as the road to the salvation of Dalits, oppressed by tradition and their monopoly on manual labor; quite another for Anderson almost a hundred years later, in the 21st century, to dismiss Gandhi's ecological concerns in *Hind Swaraj* as if they are the eccentricities of a buffoon, as 'radical atavisms' (21).

Kancha Ilaiah is as critical of the "Hindu nationalism" of Gandhi and Tilak as of the "Brahminical communism" of PC Joshi and SA Dange,[21] while G Aloysius offers a thoroughgoing critique of the "Brahminic nature" of the subcontinent's nationalism and argues that the Gandhian leadership "devised new tools to effectively blunt the thrust of popular militancy … and to diffuse the mass struggle against the old Brahminic social order".[22] The Gandhian nationalist agenda, he says, "arrested the class-like polarization process by the creation of two vertical communities based on religion and religious identities," and by placing these under the "elite unity of the respective communities." Hence India had 'nationalism without a nation', for a nation could not emerge without the destruction of the Brahmanic

social order. This is a complex and layered understanding of the role of religious identity in the Gandhian vision of India, in which horizontal class/caste unity was ruptured by vertical community building.

Ranajit Guha's essay "Discipline and Mobilize"[23] is satirically dismissive of Congress' "self-importance" (98) and its claim to be "the biggest and the best"—a "supra-class representative of the nation" (97). Guha argues that Gandhi's distrust of the masses was "inscribed firmly and copiously" in his writings and speeches, but he had a use for them: their "energies and numbers" were to be "harnessed to a nationalism which would allow the bourgeoisie to speak for its own interests in such a way as to generate the illusion of speaking for all of society" (109). If Guha's book was too "brilliant" for Anderson to engage with, he could at least have started with this essay.

Feminists have long recognized the space that Gandhi created for the participation of middle class women in the national movement, through his transposing of emotive symbols from the 'private' sphere (salt, spinning) into the 'public,' and through his valorization of "feminine' qualities of non-aggression and endurance. However, they have simultaneously noted his preference for the ever-suffering Sita over the questioning and defiant Draupadi or the Rani of Jhansi as a symbol of resistance. Thus, feminist critique notes that he continually linked the activism of women to their traditional roles and what he saw as their essential spirituality.[24] V Geetha contrasts the Gandhian notion of women as ideal *satyagrahis* who were to assume responsibility for the nation as they did for their homes, with Periyar's subversive understanding, in which a renunciation of caste went with a remaking of masculine and feminine subjectivities in an iconoclastic reimagining of identity and sexuality.[25] Ashwini Tambe enables a complicated understanding of Gandhi's concern with sexuality in the 'public' realm by placing it in the context of his "active troubling of the masculinist character" of anti-imperialist politics as much as of colonialism itself (an argument made first by Ashis Nandy).[26] Tambe says:

> "The introduction of women to a domain populated by men raised questions about how they would interact, and Gandhi sought to create routes for women's increased participation that were evacuated of sexual possibility. He fashioned therefore, a strictly antisexual mode of nationalist expression. He strenuously endorsed celibacy for his followers, very openly examined and criticized his own sexual impulses, and upheld the figure of the post sexual widow as a personal model. In Gandhi's vision, the nationalist collective was best seen as a body in need of purification and vigilance, and this body was compromised often by sexual temptation." (21)

Tambe's paper looks at how "Gandhi used the figure of the prostitute to articulate a vision of the nationalist body politic with the prostitute emblematizing the corruption that tested the body politic's virtue . . . Studying Gandhi's desexualized construction of the body politic is important because of its lasting legacy on contemporary Indian electoral politics" (21).

In short, a wide range of complex critical engagements with Gandhi are available, engaging with his notions of sexuality, economy, social order and self-discipline, that take thought and intellectual formations seriously, and yet are far from feeding into any kind of nationalism. I cannot see any of these authors I have cited, trembling in the chill of Anderson's pitiless exposure of the Indian Ideology, which forces them with a shock from their comforting "verbal emulsion."

Anderson's mode of engaging with non-Western modes of thought is to jeer like a schoolboy at funny foreign notions, and to make puerile jibes about the stylistic flourishes in Nehru's use of English. He sneers that it has a "Barbara Cartland streak;" that on Kashmir, Nehru breaks into "dithyramb of sexualized gush" that would "shame the lowest tourist brochure;" that *Discovery of India* is a "steam bath of *schwarmerei*." I had to look up *schwarmerei*, it's a German term meaning "excessive or unwholesome sentiment." Would that be the kind of unwholesomeness routinely attributed to natives by bluff and honest Englishmen?

Nehru has been so widely criticized as authoritarian and anti-democratic, and his industrialization program so roundly castigated both from ecological and democratic perspectives, that it hardly seems worthwhile to laugh at his English. Indeed, the attacks on Nehru have been substantial, and Anderson's fourth claim, that "Nehru's legacy to Republic was far more ambiguous than his admirers will admit," may be true for his admirers, but not for the substantial body of scholarship that would not fall under this category.[27] If his argument that he is exposing Indian Ideology for the first time is to hold up to scrutiny, it cannot be based on the work of admirers of Nehru alone.

Patronizing Praise for some Natives

Anderson is full of patronizing praise for Ambedkar—"intellectually head and shoulders above most of the Congress leaders"—an assessment many Indians would probably agree with, but perhaps not for the reason Anderson adduces—"in part due to far more serious training later on at the LSE and Columbia" (52). Of course. Later, Anderson says that Ambedkar's references "ranging from Renan to Acton to Carson . . . stands as a devastating indictment of the intellectual poverty of Congress and its leaders" (89). What is one to make of such an assessment of anyone's

intellectual caliber, which attributes it to western training and to reading western sources? Again, Subhash Chandra Bose is stated to be in "striking contrast" to Nehru (who "scraped a mediocre degree" from Cambridge) because he was "a brilliant student" of philosophy—where else, but at Cambridge. Cambridge, LSE and Columbia are the measure of brilliance.

India as Essentially Hindu

Anderson asserts that India has an essentially Hindu character, and that the Indian State and its agencies, state practices and policies, political parties such as the Congress and Indian society are all driven by a predominantly Hindu world-view. If a Hindu world-view is indeed hegemonic in India, why is 'Hindu nationalism' a term used pejoratively by the *opponents of the Hindu Right*, while the Hindu Right prefers to describe itself as truly 'secular' as opposed to the 'pseudo secularism' of the avowedly secular forces? The recent victory of the BJP in the General Elections with 31% of votes cast does indeed consolidate a section of Hindu votes behind it, but evidently, the majority of "Hindu" votes have been divided over other non-Hindutva parties. The BJP's politics continually attempts to produce a homogeneous "Hindu" community, but it has continually failed. This explains why, in his campaign, Narendra Modi foregrounded "development" over Hindutva, which would have been unnecessary had India been simply a "Hindu" nation. Not even all Hindus who voted for the BJP would have voted for a Hindutva agenda. To read the results of this election as a victory of "Hindu" India would be a mistake of mammoth proportions. Entire libraries can be stocked with scholarship by Indians and non-Indians, that engages with the complex politics, sociology and conceptual histories of secularism/communalism in India, and about the manner in which caste politics breaks up this assumed polarization—the BSP's occasional alliances with the BJP, for example. Anderson remains ignorant of all of this.

He prefers instead, with no explanation whatever, to use the term 'confessionalism' for India, thus bypassing all the sophisticated scholarship available on South Asia, where this term has never been used, to impose an irrelevant term derived from the Christian world-view and European experience. A confessional state essentially means one in which Catholicism is the official religion, but has been expanded in some kinds of writing to refer to a state with a single confession of faith, a faith established by the law and to which the majority of the population is expected to conform. 'Confession of faith' is a Christian notion, clearly, but is universalized now to refer to states like that of Lebanon, which uses not only its dominant religion but also minority religions of all kinds to mobilize wider groups of the population and in which the state and bodies of clergy are in a federative relationship. I will not go into the enormous problems with this kind of universalizing of terms derived from European Christian experience to the rest of the world, but will certainly comment on his use of the term for South Asia. His glib use of the term here has enormous repercussions for his understanding of secularism/communalism in India, for it reduces the politics of secularism/communalism to 'religion,' much like his colonial forebears did. For instance, on Partition:

> "... it could be argued that no political force could have averted that division, so deep were the long-standing differences, and latent antagonisms, between the two major religious communities of South Asia" (97–9).

This was the position of the Muslim advocates of Pakistan, but not acceptable to "official Indian nationalism" which according to Anderson, "canonically regarded Muslims as Hindus converted—under pressure—to Islam, whom culturally or ethnically little or nothing separates from their fellow country-men."

"Empirically however, this case cannot be dismissed," he states judiciously, because:

> "The subcontinent was not just the theatre of two major incompatible religious systems, but of an imbrications these with unequal political power, and to boot a recent dramatic reversal of the hierarchy of dominance between them. Could a secular nationalism ever have successfully unified *two such communities of believers*?" (98; emphasis added).

These communities are not only "believers," they are "populations steeped in the supernatural," and this was why "everywhere in the region, political awakening was intertwined with religious revival" (98).

Apart from the fact that this puts paid to his second claim—that Gandhi disastrously "injected" religion into the national movement—the childishly simplistic reading of the politics of Partition and of secularism/communalism boggles the imagination. The assumption of a deep civilizational difference between the two communities; the conflation of the "Indian nationalist" argument about shared cultural and ethnic affinities with the Hindu nationalist claim of forced conversions; the idea of "incompatible religious systems" (are there any religious systems that can be described as compatible?); the almost unbelievably supercilious dismissal of "populations steeped in the supernatural"—Anderson combines all the arrogance of the British Ideologist with that of a certain Marxism, to the detriment of scholarship and understanding. This is one place in the book where (a reductionist) Marxism comes into play, in the discussion on "religion." Alas, that Anderson did not take his Marxism further, to

understand communal politics in terms of the complex interconnections of political economy and religious/cultural identities. Identities that are not an ahistoric given, but in a constant state of being produced and mobilized. 'Communal riots' are a relatively recent phenomenon, from the 19th century onwards, and they are produced at the intersection of colonial governmentality, anti-colonial politics, political party agendas and local factors of social and economic conflict; eventually becoming what Paul Brass has termed, for a later period, an "institutionalized system of riot production".[28] Even those who mistakenly read Ashis Nandy as a closet Hindutva ideologist, take for granted Nandy's pioneering insight that communal violence is a phenomenon of modern politics and has nothing to do with religious belief.[29]

Anderson goes on a glorious gallop of embarrassing factual errors produced as evidence of his startling new claim of India's essentially Hindu politics, designed to shatter the delusions of the Indian Ideologists. "Hindustan" is triumphantly presented as if it means the land of Hindus ("a term in private not shunned by Congress leaders," 137; "what is hidden inside India is Hindustan," 145). But of course, the name Hindustan comes from the Persian name for the Indus—Sindhu or Hindu, simply meaning the land beyond the Indus. The Arabic Al-Hind for this region has a similar etymology. "Hindu" for the set of religious practices that are neither Islamic, Christian nor Parsi is a 19th-20th century development in Indian history, produced by colonial governmentality, while "Hindustan" retains its older meaning. Anderson may like to consider that "Hind" is a common Arabic name for girls among North Africans even today, referring to this history of relations between Arab civilization and Al-Hind, not to the religion of Hinduism.[30] He may also consider the fact that Hindustani is the name for the Hindi-Urdu language that predates India and Pakistan as well as the Hindi-Hindu/Urdu-Muslim formulations that emerged during the twin nationalist movements; that the sole Hindu nationalist party of India calls itself "Bharatiya"—not "Hindustani"—Janata Party; that Pakistan refers to India as Bharat, not Hindustan, which if it signified Land of Hindus, would be the preferred mode of address despite India's official name being Bharat. Hindustan in other words, draws on pre-colonial cosmopolitan histories, not on the set of heterogeneous religious practices that came to be named as "Hinduism" in the 19th century.

But the self-administered coup de grace by Anderson to any claim of even half-way serious journalism is this claim: "never seen or spoken" by anybody else, all under the thrall of the Indian Ideology, is the "perfectly obvious" fact that "the hand of AFSPA has fallen where the reach of Hinduism has stopped." The Armed Forces Special Powers Act is in force, he says, in Kashmir, Nagaland-Mizoram and Punjab—"regions respectively Muslim, Christian and Sikh," and in the Naxalite corridor with "pre-Aryan tribal populations with their own forest cults" (144).

First the glaring factual errors that put paid to his theoretical claim. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) is in force only in the border regions of India, not in the "Naxalite corridor." Other extraordinary laws are in force in Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh, not AFSPA.[31] Second, AFSPA was not, and is not, only in force in non-Hindu areas, even if we consider "religion" to be a relevant factor at all. AFSPA was first passed as the Armed Forces (Assam and Manipur) Special Powers Act of 1958 and enforced in the Naga inhabited areas of Assam and Manipur. The Nagas opposed the merger of their area with that of India on the grounds that the "Naga way of life" (not 'Christian' way of life) was racially and socio-politically different from the Indians. The Mizo National Front (MNF) of Mizoram, a state described by Anderson as "Christian," called for an armed struggle 'to liberate Mizoram from Indian colonialism.' Indian colonialism, not Hindu rule. The Union Territory of Manipur was formed in 1949 after the Hindu majority kingdom of Manipur, which had been constituted as an independent constitutional monarchy with a democratically elected Assembly, was forced into a merger with India. In 1964, an armed movement in Manipur demanded the separation of Manipur from the Indian Union, and by 1970 the AFSPA was made applicable to Manipur. Also in 1970, the Hindu-majority Tripura was covered by it, as was Arunachal Pradesh, where one-third of the population is Hindu. In 1983 it was imposed in Punjab, and in 1990 in Kashmir and in Hindu-majority Assam where a separatist movement had become militant.

Essentially, religion had nothing to do with the promulgation and imposition of AFSPA. It is imposed in areas affected by internal rebellion, insurgency or militancy, and it provides the armed forces with an enabling environment to carry out their duties without fear of being prosecuted for their actions.[32] The AFSPA is about of the assumed "integrity" of the Indian nation-state, not "Hindu India."

In the context of Africa, Mahmood Mamdani has consistently argued against Western characterizations of various kinds of conflicts and what is termed generically as 'genocide,' in terms of ancient hatred between historically unvarying ethnic and racial identities. He insists on complicating the picture with the history of colonialism, identity formation, and the configurations around specific conflicts—not to do this, he says, is the 'denial of a history and a politics' to the non-West.[33]

Anderson's analysis is a prime instance of this kind of denial. He translates into the language of 'religious identity" three radically different kinds of politics—in Punjab, separatist nationalism; in Nagaland and

Kashmir, armed struggles for independence from India, regarded as an occupying power that moved in after the British left; and in the Naxalite corridor, Maoist insurgency for the overthrow of the exploitative capitalist Indian state. Of course religious, tribal and other identities inevitably come to play a role in any mass movement, but to claim the primary identity of these movements as Sikh, Muslim, Christian and "forest cults," and to characterize the Indian state's authoritarian response as "Hindu" is to render them entirely in terms legible to colonial ideology and to depoliticize these encounters completely.

Anderson is determined not to let any knowledge of history or any fact whatsoever stand in the way of his characterization of India as a "confessional state by default" (145). He makes no distinction between Israel's constitutional Judaism, Ireland's institutional Catholicism and India, although India did not establish a religion-based state. For him, in all three cases, religion "provided the genetic code of the movement" (146). This kind of lazy generalization provides no way of distinguishing between states with secular constitutions but entrenched practices that marginalize minorities, and states that build anti-minorityism into their constitutions. The difference is like that between racism in Britain and racism in Apartheid-era South Africa.

Anderson is by no means the first to note the failures and limitations of Indian secularism, which has been attacked both for being too derivatively robust (for instance, Ashis Nandy) and not robust enough (not only by Achin Vanaik, one of the "few true critics" whose "courage" he recognizes, but by numerous Marxist scholars.[34] However, it is not only that Anderson's hearty attack on "the sophism and evasions" (171) of Indian secularism is not the preserve of one courageous true critic alone, but is a very familiar one in India. More crucial to note is that Anderson is unable to comprehend that "secularism" as it arose in the particular history of Europe over the 16th to 18th centuries is not what is called "secularism" in other parts of the world, where relations between the modern state and religious community developed in entirely different historical contexts, one of the most significant of these being colonialism. Anderson and other such critics who search all over the world for "democracy," modernity," "secularism," or "individualism" in exactly the shape and form in which it emerged in a few countries of Western Europe, can only always find these other parts of the world lacking—as Aditya Nigam puts it, "our modernity is incomplete, our secularism impure, our democracy immature, our development arrested and our capitalism retarded".[35]

It is one thing to note the way in which the dominant community norms become naturalized as common sense in any society, quite another to simply explain a society in terms of religion alone. Why does it never occur to Anderson, for example, to use "Christian" in conjunction with the British Raj, ever? Because it would be an utterly irrelevant and misleading category to describe British colonialism, even though the Christian worldview is naturalized in the Western world—Sunday as 'the day of rest,' for example.

And finally, we come to Anderson's last claim that "Indian democracy is not contradicted by caste inequality, but rather enabled by it"—which on first sight appears to be Rudolph and Rudolph's well known "modernity of tradition" argument, but he has never read them.[36] It turns out rather, to be a misreading of mammoth proportions. Bravely untrammeled by any scholarship, Anderson proclaims his understanding of caste as "an impediment to collective action." Caste "fixes in hierarchical position," "divides disadvantaged groups from one another," and so on and on (111–112). Later he acknowledges the powerful caste mobilizations that have reshaped Indian democracy and cites Christophe Jaffrelot's "silent revolution"; but—he asserts sternly—"castes are not classes" (154). Suddenly awakening (for the second time in the book) to a reductionist Marxism, he declares—"constructed by religion and divided by occupation, they are denizens of a universe of symbolism governed by customary rituals and taboos." Caste can only lead to "recognition," not "redistribution." (Where was this muscle-bound Marxism when we needed it in the discussion on Independence and Partition, where tea-time chit chat passed for analysis?) Anderson needs to note that caste mobilizations have fundamentally transformed Indian democracy and that no Left analysis that fails to take caste seriously, that sees it simply as an impediment to class mobilization, has survived the twentieth century.

So that's *The Indian Ideology*—telling the story of India's independence and the partition of the subcontinent in the style of a British tabloid; claiming startling originality partly through dishonest citation practices and partly because of ignorance about well known bodies of scholarship; basing large assertions on factual errors. This manuscript would not have passed a blind peer review. But this is a book by a well known and respected Marxist scholar. There was no blind peer review.

NOTES

1. Vijay Prashad, "A flawed project," *Naked Punch*, December 26, 2012, http://www.nakedpunch.com/articles/158, accessed March 26, 2013; Dilip Simeon, "Abominable Anderson," *Bargad*, November 9, 2012, http://bargad.org/2012/11/09/dilip-simeon-on-perry-anderson/, accessed April 1, 2013; Ananya Vajpeyi, "'Nimbus of empire, charisma of nation': a response to Perry Anderson," *Seminar* 636 (August 2012).

2. Karuna Mantena, "Letter to London Review of Books," 34:16 (August 30, 2012), http://www.lrb.co.uk/v34/n13/perry-anderson/gandhi-centre-stage.

3. Praful Bidwai, "Respect Gandhi if you will, don't sentimentalise him: Interview with Perry Anderson," *Outlookindia.com*, November 12, 2012, http://www.outlookindia.com/article/Respect-Gandhi-If-You-Will-Dont-Sentimentalise-Him/282832 accessed on March 28, 2013.

4. Prashad, "A flawed project."

5. Of all the responses listed here to Anderson, only Vajpeyi can be described as 'nationalist'.

6. Jaswant Singh, *Jinnah: India, Partition, Independence* (Delhi: Rupa and Co., 2009).

7. Sumit Sarkar, *Modern India 1885–1947* (Macmillan Publishers, 1983).

8. Uma Chakravarti, "Beyond the altekarian paradigm: towards a new understanding of gender relations in early India," *Social Scientist*, 16:183 (1988); Chakravarti, "Whatever happened to the Vedic Dasi: orientalism, nationalism, and a script for the past," in *Recasting Women: Essays in Colonial History* eds. Sangari Kumkum and Vaid Sudesh (New Delhi: Kali for Women, 1989); Sudipta Kaviraj, "The Imaginary institution of India," *Subaltern Studies VII* eds. Partha Chatterjee and Gyaneddra Pandey (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994).

9. Balraj Puri, *Kashmir: Towards Insurgency* (Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 1993).

10. Too numerous to be listed, for a full list of Gautam Navlakha's writings in *EPW* from 1986 to the present on Kashmir and on democratic rights violations by the Indian state in general, see http://www.epw.in/auhtors/gauntam-navlakha?page=11.

11. Mridu Rai, *Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights, and the History of Kashmir* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Puri, *Kashmir*.

12. Akshaya Mukul, "First-past-the-post system unfair: CEC," *Times of India* (May 5, 2005).

13. S. Anand, "Despite parliamentary democracy," *Himal Southasian* (August, 2008).

14. AR Desai, *Violation of Democratic Rights in India* (Hyderabad: Sangam Books, 1986); Desai, *Expanding Governmental Lawlessness and Organized Struggles* (Bombay: Popular Prakshan Pvt. Ltd., 1991); Ujjwal Kumar Singh, *The State, Democracy and Anti-Terror Laws in India* (Sage, 2007); K.G. Kannabiran, *The Wages of Impunity: Power, Justice, and Human Rights* (Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 2003); Prakash Louis and R. Vashum eds., *Extraordinary Laws in India: A reader for Understanding Legislations Endangering Civil Liberties* (New Delhi: Indian Social Institute, 2002).

15. Upendra Baxi's writings are available at http://www.upendrabaxi.net/documents.html.

16. Erik H. Erikson, *Gandhi's Truth: On the Origins of Militant Nonviolence* (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1970); Dennis Dalton, *Nonviolence in Action: Gandhi's Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); David Hardiman, *Gandhi in his Time and Ours* (Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2003).

17. Mridu Rai, "Joseph Lelyveld's "Great Soul" or How to Damn with Faint Praise," Kafila (April 13, 2011), http://kafila.org/2011/04/13/mridu-rai-reviews-joseph-lelyveld-gandhi-biography-great-soul/ (Accessed June 19, 2014); 'Editorial', *The Hindu* (March 2011).

18. Vinay Lal, "Gandhi's last fast," *Gandhi Marg* (July-September, 1989).

19. Cited by Dilip Simeon, "The assassination of Mahatma Gandhi: Inquiry Commission Report," *Dilip Simeon's Blog*, http://dilipsimeon.blogspot.in/2012/03/reprt-of-commission-of-inquiry-into.html (Accessed April 4, 2013).

20. Cited by Lal, "Gandhi's last fast."

21. Kancha Ilaiah, "Towards the Dalitization of the Nation," in *Wages of Freedom: Fifty Years of the Indian Nation-State* ed. Partha Chatterjee (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998).

22. G. Aloysius, *Nationalism without a Nation in India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998): 220.

23. Ranajit Guha, "Discipline and mobilize," in Chatterjee and Pandey eds. *Subaltern Studies VII*.

24. Radha Kumar, *The History of Doing: An Illustrated Account of Movements for Women's Rights and Feminism in India, 1800–1990* (Delhi: Kali for Women, 1993).

25. V. Geetha, "Periyar, women and an ethic of citizenship," *Economic and Political Weekly*, 33:17 (Apr. 25 May 1, 1998).

26. Ashwini Tambe, "Gandhi's 'fallen' sisters" difference and the national body politic," *Social Scientist*, 37:1/2 (Jan-Feb, 2009), 21–38.

27. Kaviraj, "A critique of the passive revolution," *Economic and Political Weekly* 23:45/47 (November, 1998); P. Chatterjee, *Nation and its Fragments* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Prabhat Patnaik, "Political strategies of economic development," in Chatterjee et.al. eds. *Wages of Freedom*; Nivedita Menon and Aditya Nigam, *Power and Contestation: India after 1989* (London: Zed Books; Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2007).

28. Paul Brass, The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India (University of Washington Press, 2003).

29. Radhika Deasi, "Culturalism and contemporary right: Indian bourgeoisie and political Hindutva," *Economic and Political Weekly*, 34:12 (March 20–26, 1999).

30. Hind certainly does not mean 100 camels in Arabic, as popular wisdom on the Internet would have you believe!

31. Chhattisgarh is covered by the state's Chhattisgarh Public Security Act, Andhra Pradesh by the Central Government Unlawful Activities Prevention Act and the provisions of the Indian Penal Code are also routinely used to deal with suspected Maousts Singh, *The State, Democracy and Anti-Terror Laws in India.*

32. Pushpita, Das, "The History of Armed Forces Special Powers Act, in *Armed Forces Special Powers Act: The Debate* ed. Vivek Chadha (IDA Monograph Series No.7; Lancer's Press, Nov. 2012).

33. For example, Mahmood Mamdani, "The politics of naming: genocide, civil war, insurgency," *London Review of Books*, 29:5 (March 8, 2007).

34. For instance, Javeed Alam, The indispensability of secularism," Social Scientiest, 27:7–8 (July-August, 1998); Alam, *India: Living with Modernity* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999); Sarkar, *Modern India*.

35. Aditya Nigam, "Look inward, angel," *Daily News and Analysis*, August 13, 2013, http://www.dnaindia.com/mumbai/report-look-inward-angel-1873681.

36. Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne H. Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).

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